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Abstract
This paper shows under which conditions debt securitization of banks can increase
the systemic risks in the banking sector. We use a simple model to show how securiti-
zation can reduce the individual banks’ economic capital requirements by transferring
risks to other market participants. This can increase systemic risks and impact finan-
cial stability in two ways. First, if the risks are transferred to unregulated market
participants there is less capital in the economy to cover these risks. And second, if
banks invest in asset-backed securities, the transferred risk causes interbank linkages
to grow. This results in an increasing systemic risk for which the economic capital put
aside is insufficient. We develop a modified version of the infectious defaults model of
Davis and Lo (2001) and use this model to quantify the augmented systemic risk of in-
creased bank linkages in the banking sector.
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1 Introduction
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) issuance, especially Collateral Debt Obligations (CDO) and
Collateral Loan Obligations (CLO), shows a remarkable growth during recent years and
can be expected to continue over the next years.
What makes these ABS bonds so attractive for banks? Several factors play a role. First,
there is an economic risk transfer, that is, banks can transfer part of their risks to the
market by selling fractions of their debt. Secondly, funding a loan can become significantly
cheaper since the expected loss and economic capital are reduced. Third, securitization
offers arbitrage spread opportunities and finally, banks can obtain regulatory capital re-
lief. Using the 8%-rule this can easily be shown (e.g. see Bluhm et al. (2003), and Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2003)). In addition, banks increasingly invest invest
in ABS bonds since this can offer new investment opportunities.
This paper focusses on the economic risk transfer and shows under which conditions
this risk transfer of an individual bank can increase the systemic risks of the whole bank-
ing sector.
This paper also attempts to present a systemic risk model called for by Goodhart (2004)
who states that “...we need to construct models of systemic stability, not just of individual
bank probability of default [...].” (page 3)
We propose an extended version of the "infectious default" model of Davis and Lo (2001)
to build a model of the banking system that explicitly includes interbank linkages through
securitization while also modelling potential contagious effects (e.g. see Giesecke and We-
ber, 2004) .
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present a simple model to demonstrate the
economic risk transfer through securitization. In the next section a model of the banking
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system including contagious effects is proposed. Third, we present simulation results for
different structures of interbank linkages caused by an increased securitization of banks
and show under which conditions the amount of capital in the banking system is insuffi-
cient given the linkages between banks. Finally, we summarize our findings and conclude.
2 Risk transfer through securitization
Banks engage in the securitization business due to different reasons. The most important
ones are economic risk transfer, different funding, spread arbitrage opportunities and reg-
ulatory capital relief. In this section we focus on economic risk transfer and use a simple
model to quantify the amount of risk which is transferred from a bank to the market.
Assume we have an index set, I = {1, . . . ,m}, referring to loans of a portfolio. The
easiest case possible is to assume that the complete portfolio is selected for securitization
through a CLO. Based on this collateral portfolio, an equity piece and one or more mez-
zanine and senior pieces are sold to different investors. The equity piece, often called the
first loss piece (FLP), receives interest and principal payments only if all other investors
received their promised payments.
In the literature different ways to model the cash flows are proposed. The most common
ones are the simple BET (e.g. Moody’s Investors Service (1996)), double BET (e.g. Moody’s
Investors Service (1998)), the lognormal model (e.g. Moody’s Investors Service (2000)) and
methods using Monte Carlo simulations or fourier transforms (e.g. Moody’s Investors Ser-
vice (2003)). In the BET and double BET we construct a new portfolio of loans that are
all equal and independent from each other and mimic the original portfolio. The number
of defaults is modelled by use of the binomial distribution. The lognormal method uses a
lognormal distribution for the cumulative number of default instead of the binomial distri-
bution. In this way we do not need to assume that all the loans are equal and independent.
4
In the Monte Carlo method and fourier transform method we use the information of all the
loans in the portfolio directly and keep in mind that there is a certain correlation between
the loans to find the cumulative probability of default. A drawback of this last two methods
is that they are rather time consuming.
Applying one of the methods above we can model the cash flows in case of securitization
given a value for the first loss piece. For simplicity the loss given default (LGD) is taken
equal to 100%. The loss statistic for the portfolio I is given by (L1, . . . , Lm). Hence the total
loss in case there is no securitization is equal to
L =
m∑
i=1
Li.
For the securitization we assume that no Interest Coverage tests (IC) or Overcollateral-
ization tests (OC) are used and also no cash reserve account is available. We also suppose
that the bank manages to sell all the senior tranches and keeps the equity piece itself. The
securitized portfolio is hence protected against losses exceeding the first loss piece. The
loss of the securitized portfolio is equal to the loss of the equity piece and will be denoted
with Lsec. Since the equity piece absorbs all the losses up to a certain level FLP its loss is
given by
Lsec = min(
m∑
i=1
Li, FLP ).
The change (denoted by ∆) in expected loss E(L) from the bank that securitizes its debt is
given by
∆EL = E(L)− E(Lsec).
The required economic capital (denoted with ECα) is defined as the difference of the α%-
quantile (qα) and the expected loss. Hence the difference in economic capital due to the
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securitization is
∆ECα = ECα(L)−ECα(Lsec)
= qα(L)− E(L)− (qα(Lsec)− E(Lsec))
= ∆qα −∆EL (1)
with ∆qα = qα(L)− qα(Lsec), the change of the α%-quantile. In this case without tests and
without a cash reserve account the losses of the portfolio with and without securitization
will be increasing functions of percentages of defaults in the portfolio. The mezzanine and
senior pieces that are sold to the market have a total loss which is denoted with Lsp. Since
no extra money is transferred the sum of the loss of the equity piece Lsec and the loss of
the senior pieces Lsp will always be equal to the loss in case there is no securitization L.
This leads to
E(L) = E(Lsec) + E(Lsp). (2)
The three losses are all nondecreasing functions of the percentages of default which im-
plies that the correlation between the loss of the senior piece and equity piece is equal to
one. Using this dependence and the fact that the sum of those two is equal to the loss
without securitization, we get the following equation for the quantile functions
qα(L) = qα(Lsec) + qα(Lsp). (3)
With the results of equations (2) and (3) we can rewrite equation (1) as
∆ECα = qα(Lsp)− E(Lsp). (4)
Hence, ∆ECα denotes the reduction of economic capital that the bank has to put aside.
In other words, it is the regulatory capital relief obtained by securitization. Since the
capital relief of the originator is due to the credit risk transfer to the market, the market
now bears the risks that was previously borne by the bank. This transfer of risks can
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protection buying protection selling number of institutions
% of total assets % of total assets surveyed
France 0.2− 1.5% 0.1− 1.8% 3
Spain 3− 15% n.a. 4
Ireland 1− 10% 0.2− 0.6% 6-9
Italy 0− 6.5% 0.2− 7.5% 4
Portugal 5− 30% n.a. 4
Table 1: Summary of the transfer of structured products (ABS and synthetic
CDO’s)
be classified as follows: first, the debt is sold to a certain number of unregulated market
participants that are not obliged to and hence are likely not to put sufficient capital aside.
And second, the debt is sold (i.e. transferred) to regulated market participants, e.g. banks.
In the first case the overall amount of capital put aside might be insufficient from an in-
dividuals perspective and in the second case, the amount of capital to cover risks might be
insufficient from a market-wide (global) perspective. We will focus on the second case and
show that increased interbank linkages caused by securitization lead to an increased sys-
temic risk and hence to an augmented amount of required capital to cover these systemic
risks in the market.
A survey from the European Central Bank from May 2004 (European Central Bank,
2004) studies the transfer of risk between several European banks. A summary of the
transfer of the structured products (Asset-backed securities and synthetic collateral debt
obligations) is given in Table 1 and shows that this last risk is non negligible since up to
30% (see Portugal) of a banks capital can be invested in CDO’s from other banks. In the
next section we will concentrate on the effect of this change in linkages.
Based on the table above, we will model the effect of securitization on interbank link-
ages. We will assume that an economy consists of N banks with equal interbank exposures
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α for all banks. We then assume that n banks (n ∈ N ) securitize a percentage γ of their
debt and that m banks (m ∈ N ) buy tranches of this securitized debt accounting for some
percentage of their book capital. This increase in capital from other banks will increase in-
terbank linkages and therefore the systemic risk due to the fact that the loss distribution
gets heavier tails with higher correlations.
In the next section we use a Monte-Carlo simulation with different linkage matrices
representing different interbank linkages resulting from the risk transfer described above.
We show how a small increase in such linkages and thus in correlations can require an
increased amount of capital as a cushion for systemic risks. In doing this, we will also
differentiate between complete and incomplete bank structures as introduced by Allen
and Gale (2002).
3 The Model
In this section we present a latent variables version of the "infectious default" model by
Davis and Lo (2001) to analyze systemic risk and financial stability. In the original version
of Davis and Lo it is assumed that a given portfolio of n bonds may either default directly
or as a result of infection, i.e. due to the default of some other bond. The static version of
this model is
Zi = Xi + (1−Xi)
1−∏
j 6=i
(1−XjYji)
 (5)
where Zi = 1 if the ith bond defaults, and Zi = 0 otherwise, Xi = 1 if the ith bond defaults
directly and Xi = 0 otherwise, if Xj = 1 and Yji = 1 the infection occurs, for Yji = 0 no
infection occurs.
We extend this model in two respects: First, we relax the assumption of homogeneous
entities in the portfolio and second, we modify the "infection matrix" Yji to capture the true
interbank linkages. Hence, the matrix Yji is not restricted to have values of 0 and 1 but
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can contain all possible values in the interval [0, 1].
In order to relax the assumption of homogeneous bonds, we use a Monte-Carlo sim-
ulation to obtain the default and loss distribution. Since we aim to present a model of
systemic risk and not of an individual bank’s portfolio, we model bank defaults and inter-
bank linkages. In other words, we are modelling a countries’ "bank portfolio" and not an
individual banks’ portfolio.
We assume that each banks’ default probability pii (i = 1, ..., n) can be modelled with a
latent factor Si that follows some distribution with mean zero and variance one. All Si are
independent and identically distributed.
A bank i defaults directly (Xi = 1) if the realization of the latent variable Si is below
some threshold Di as follows
Xi = 1⇐⇒ Si ≤ Di
so that pii = P (Si ≤ Di). Hence, Xi denotes a direct default. An indirect default, denoted
as X?i = 1, is given if there is a linkage between Xi and one or more other banks Xj that
defaulted directly. Here, we extend the original model and allow Yji to contain any value
in [0, 1] representing the percentage of assets hold by another bank. If the percentages of
assets deposited with other banks that directly defaulted exceeds a bank-specific threshold
di, bank i defaults (indirectly).
X?i = 1⇐⇒ {YjiX}i ≥ di
Hence, obligor i defaults either directly or indirectly indicated by Zi as follows Zi =
Xi + (1−Xi)X?i which implies
Zi = 1⇐⇒ Xi = 1 ∨X?i = 1.
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The important feature of this model is that linkages between bonds or banks can be
modelled via a dependence matrix Yji that can incorporate direct linkages that are asym-
metric or symmetric. We believe that this approach is superior to the use of correlation
matrices since these implicitly assume symmetric linkages. Indirect linkages are not taken
into account for simplicity.1 We will also differentiate between complete and incomplete
linkages (i.e. structures) as in Allen and Gale (2001) and in Upper and Worms (2002).
Assume the following infection matrix Yji with 4 banks, called A, B, C and D:
Yji = α

0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0

(6)
This matrix represents the values of the linkages, i.e. α deposits of bank j with bank i.
More precisely, bank j has deposits at bank i. Hence, the matrix states that bank A has
deposits at bank D, that bank B has deposits at bank A, bank C has deposits at bank B
and bank D has no deposits with any bank. If we assume further that only bank B defaults
directly, the vector X is given as follows
X =

0
1
0
0

. (7)
Then, YjiX yields
1The inclusion of indirect linkages would increase the computational time of the Monte-Carlo simulation.
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X? = YjiX = α

0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0


0
1
0
0

= α

0
0
1
0

. (8)
Hence, bank C defaults by infection, i.e. indirectly under the assumption that the loss
of α deposits leads to a default of bank C.
We now present four different matrices Yji (i.e. structures) of direct linkages. First, a
complete and symmetric structure. Second, a complete and asymmetric structure. Third,
an incomplete and symmetric structure and finally, an incomplete and asymmetric struc-
ture. We still assume for simplicity that the values of the linkages, i.e. the percentages
of capital of bank i hold by bank j is equal among all linkages and denoted by α. This
simplification is just for presentation purposes and will be relaxed later.
The four matrices Yji are presented below. The complete and symmetric structure for
an equal linkage denoted by α is given by the following matrix
Y 1ji = α

0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0

. (9)
Evidently, this structure is characterized by symmetric one-to-one relationships be-
tween banks. Hence, to match these linkages with real data, the αs have to be smaller
in a complete structure than in an incomplete structure since the sum of linkages in a
symmetric structure can easily exceed realistic values. Note that different percentages of
linkages (αi 6= α ∧ αi > 0, ∀i) would lead to a complete but asymmetric structure.
An example of such a matrix is given as follows:
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Yji =

0 0.1 0.1 0.2
0.05 0 0.15 0.01
0.02 0.05 0 0.1
0.025 0.05 0.05 0

. (10)
An example of a complete and asymmetric structure for αi = α ∀i is represented by
Y 2ji = α

0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0

. (11)
This structure is complete since the linkages could also be represented by an upper-
triangular matrix.
Finally, we present two examples for incomplete structures. An incomplete and sym-
metric structure is given by
Y 3ji = α

0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0

(12)
where the matrix entries could be random but must follow Yji = Yij∀i, j.
An incomplete and asymmetric structure is represented by
Y 4ji = α

0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0

(13)
where the off-diagonal matrix entries could be random without further restrictions.
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The next section uses these four different structures for simulations with different val-
ues for αi for all banks N . We will also investigate the effect, the number of originating
banks N and the number of buying banks M has on the market-wide required economic
capital. The number of buying banks M is equal to the total number of linkages. For ex-
ample, M = 3 in the last example representing an incomplete and asymmetric structure
for N = 4. This value M can be viewed as a measure of the concentration (diversification)
of the risk transfer.
4 Simulations
We now perform a Monte-Carlo simulation of the model presented in section 3 in order
to quantify the change in required economic capital resulting from increased interbank
linkages.
The default probability (dp) is set to dp = 1% for all banks and the sample size of
the normal distribution we draw from to obtain the default distribution for all banks is
n = 10.000. We are aware of the fact that changing the copula has a considerable effect on
the shape of the loss distribution and hence the EC (e.g. see Duffie and Singleton (2003)).
The MC simulation is performed for different number of banks N in the economy, differ-
ent linkage structures and different numbers of interbank linkages M within the assumed
structures.
The aim of the simulation is to evaluate the change in economic capital for different
values of α that represent the percentages of deposits a bank holds of another bank. The
threshold value di that determines a default of bank i is set to di = 0.2. We compute
the 99.99% quantile of the resulting default distribution and compute the economic capital
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for this quantile.2 This economic capital is computed under the assumption that there
are no linkages (α = 0) and different degrees of linkages, i.e. α = 0.050, 0.075, 0.1, 0.2 for
each assumed structure of linkages. Results are presented in table 2 and show that the
additional economic capital necessary increases with increasing α and increasing number
of linkages (diversification) M . The additional economic capital decreases with increasing
number of banks N .
For the complete and symmetric structure (top panel) and no linkages α = 0, the EC is
49%, 19%, 14% and 5.5% for N = 4, N = 10, N = 20 and N = 100, respectively. For example,
the EC for N = 10 increases from 19% (α = 0) to 29% (α = 0.05). Since it is a complete
structure, linkages for higher α are not plausible since the sum of deposits hold by each
bank would well exceed any realistic level. This is especially true for N = 100 where we
only report results for α = 0.
For the complete and asymmetric structure, the EC is smaller for the largest reported
values of α for N = 4 and N = 10 than for the complete and symmetric structure.
We now focus on the incomplete structures. Here, we assume different values of M .
Columns three and four show that the number of linkages M for N = 20 banks matters for
α > 0. For example, for α = 0.2 and M = 10, the EC is 29% while for α = 0.1 and M = 20,
the EC is 19%.
We can conclude that a larger number of banks and a larger number of linkages yield
lower values of EC. This diversification effect has an important implication. The higher
the number of (equal) linkages between banks, the lower is the resulting difference be-
tween the sum of economic capital put aside by each bank and the optimal economy-wide
economic capital required as a cushion against extreme (systemic) risks.
In other words, if banks do not explicitly account for increased linkages with other
2We abstract from absolute losses and recovery rates. However, this is just for presentation purposes since
the Monte Carlo simulation can also be used to compute a loss distribution of the banking sector.
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Table 2: Simulation Results, EC(q = 99.99%)
structures N = 4 N = 10 N = 20 N = 20 N = 100
complete symmetric M = 12 M = 90 M = 380 M = 380 M = 9900
α = 0 0.49 0.19 0.14 0.055
α = 0.050 0.49 0.29 0.14
α = 0.075 0.49 0.59 -
α = 0.100 0.99 - -
α = 0.200 - - -
complete asymmetric M = 6 M = 45 M = 190 M = 190 M = 4950
α = 0 0.49 0.19 0.14 0.055
α = 0.05 0.49 0.29 0.14
α = 0.075 0.49 0.34 -
α = 0.10 0.74 - -
α = 0.20 - - -
incomplete symmetric M = 6 M = 10 M = 10 M = 20 M = 20
α = 0 0.49 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.055
α = 0.05 0.49 0.24 0.14 0.16 0.055
α = 0.075 0.49 0.29 0.14 0.16 0.055
α = 0.10 0.74 0.29 0.14 0.19 0.055
α = 0.20 0.99 0.59 0.29 0.34 0.075
incomplete asymmetric M = 3 M = 5 M = 5 M = 10 M = 10
α = 0 0.49 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.055
α = 0.05 0.49 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.055
α = 0.075 0.49 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.055
α = 0.10 0.49 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.055
α = 0.20 0.99 0.39 0.24 0.24 0.060
di = 0.2
M is equal to the number of interbank linkages due to the CDO issuance. For example, in the complete
symmetric structure M = N2 −N . For N = 4, M is equal to 12.
banks, the risks associated with this are minimized the larger the number of banks is and
the more these banks are linked to each other. However, this last assumption only holds
for equal or similar linkages. Extreme asymmetries, i.e. extreme heterogeneity of the
values αi would lead to different results.
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5 Conclusions
This paper shows how banks can reduce their capital requirements by transferring risks
to other market participants. We focus on the case that these risks are transferred to
other banks thereby increasing the interbank linkages. We develop a model for the whole
banking sector that accounts for these linkages and shows how these linkages can increase
extreme or systemic risks and thus pose a threat to the stability of the financial system. We
analyze this effect for different linkage structures of the banking sector and find that risks
can increase significantly especially if the linkages are complete and symmetric rather
than incomplete and asymmetric. In addition, the larger the number of banks, the lower
is the increase of systemic risks.
This paper is a first step to develop global models of systemic risk and financial stability.
Future research could also calibrate this model to real data of the banking sector of the
European Union or different individual countries.
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